ci: enforce strict exit codes in workflow tests
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- Remove `|| echo "⚠️ ..."` fallbacks that masked failures - Add explicit `exit 1` on port readiness failures and missing test directories - Track port_ready flag in health check loops to fail if services don't start - Replace warning emoji (⚠️) with error emoji (❌) for actual failures - Fix docs-validation to use curated Markdown target list excluding high-noise directories - Update rust-zk-tests paths from gpu_acceleration/research to dev
This commit is contained in:
aitbc
@@ -2,9 +2,13 @@
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## Overview
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This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preserving features, focusing on zero-knowledge receipt attestation and confidential transactions. The analysis uses the STRIDE methodology to systematically identify threats and their mitigations.
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This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's
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privacy-preserving features, focusing on zero-knowledge receipt attestation and
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confidential transactions. The analysis uses the STRIDE methodology to
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systematically identify threats and their mitigations.
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## Document Version
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- Version: 1.0
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- Date: December 2024
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- Status: Published - Shared with Ecosystem Partners
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@@ -12,6 +16,7 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
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## Scope
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### In-Scope Components
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1. **ZK Receipt Attestation System**
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- Groth16 circuit implementation
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- Proof generation service
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@@ -25,6 +30,7 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
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- Audit logging infrastructure
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### Out-of-Scope Components
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- Core blockchain consensus
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- Basic transaction processing
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- Non-confidential marketplace operations
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@@ -32,123 +38,136 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
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## Threat Actors
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| Actor | Motivation | Capability | Impact |
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|-------|------------|------------|--------|
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| Malicious Miner | Financial gain, sabotage | Access to mining software, limited compute | High |
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| Compromised Coordinator | Data theft, market manipulation | System access, private keys | Critical |
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| External Attacker | Financial theft, privacy breach | Public network, potential exploits | High |
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| Regulator | Compliance investigation | Legal authority, subpoenas | Medium |
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| Insider Threat | Data exfiltration | Internal access, knowledge | High |
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| Quantum Computer | Break cryptography | Future quantum capability | Future |
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| Actor | Motivation | Capability | Impact |
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| ----------------------- | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | -------- |
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| Malicious Miner | Financial gain, sabotage | Access to mining software, limited compute | High |
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| Compromised Coordinator | Data theft, market manipulation | System access, private keys | Critical |
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| External Attacker | Financial theft, privacy breach | Public network, potential exploits | High |
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| Regulator | Compliance investigation | Legal authority, subpoenas | Medium |
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| Insider Threat | Data exfiltration | Internal access, knowledge | High |
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| Quantum Computer | Break cryptography | Future quantum capability | Future |
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## STRIDE Analysis
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### 1. Spoofing
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#### ZK Receipt Attestation
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Proof Forgery | Attacker creates fake ZK proofs | Medium | High | ✅ Groth16 soundness property<br>✅ Verification on-chain<br>⚠️ Trusted setup security |
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| Identity Spoofing | Miner impersonates another | Low | Medium | ✅ Miner registration with KYC<br>✅ Cryptographic signatures |
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| Coordinator Impersonation | Fake coordinator services | Low | High | ✅ TLS certificates<br>⚠️ DNSSEC recommended |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| ------------------------- | ------------------------------- | ---------- | ------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Proof Forgery | Attacker creates fake ZK proofs | Medium | High | ✅ Groth16 soundness property<br>✅ Verification on-chain<br>⚠️ Trusted setup security |
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| Identity Spoofing | Miner impersonates another | Low | Medium | ✅ Miner registration with KYC<br>✅ Cryptographic signatures |
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| Coordinator Impersonation | Fake coordinator services | Low | High | ✅ TLS certificates<br>⚠️ DNSSEC recommended |
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#### Confidential Transactions
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Key Spoofing | Fake public keys for participants | Medium | High | ✅ HSM-protected keys<br>✅ Certificate validation |
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| Authorization Forgery | Fake audit authorization | Low | High | ✅ Signed tokens<br>✅ Short expiration times |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| --------------------- | --------------------------------- | ---------- | ------ | -------------------------------------------------- |
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| Key Spoofing | Fake public keys for participants | Medium | High | ✅ HSM-protected keys<br>✅ Certificate validation |
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| Authorization Forgery | Fake audit authorization | Low | High | ✅ Signed tokens<br>✅ Short expiration times |
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### 2. Tampering
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#### ZK Receipt Attestation
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Circuit Modification | Malicious changes to circom circuit | Low | Critical | ✅ Open-source circuits<br>✅ Circuit hash verification |
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| Proof Manipulation | Altering proofs during transmission | Medium | High | ✅ End-to-end encryption<br>✅ On-chain verification |
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| Setup Parameter Poisoning | Compromise trusted setup | Low | Critical | ⚠️ Multi-party ceremony needed<br>⚠️ Secure destruction of toxic waste |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| ------------------------- | ----------------------------------- | ---------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Circuit Modification | Malicious changes to circom circuit | Low | Critical | ✅ Open-source circuits<br>✅ Circuit hash verification |
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| Proof Manipulation | Altering proofs during transmission | Medium | High | ✅ End-to-end encryption<br>✅ On-chain verification |
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| Setup Parameter Poisoning | Compromise trusted setup | Low | Critical | ⚠️ Multi-party ceremony needed<br>⚠️ Secure destruction of toxic waste |
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#### Confidential Transactions
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Data Tampering | Modify encrypted transaction data | Medium | High | ✅ AES-GCM authenticity<br>✅ Immutable audit logs |
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| Key Substitution | Swap public keys in transit | Low | High | ✅ Certificate pinning<br>✅ HSM key validation |
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| Access Control Bypass | Override authorization checks | Low | High | ✅ Role-based access control<br>✅ Audit logging of all changes |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| --------------------- | --------------------------------- | ---------- | ------ | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Data Tampering | Modify encrypted transaction data | Medium | High | ✅ AES-GCM authenticity<br>✅ Immutable audit logs |
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| Key Substitution | Swap public keys in transit | Low | High | ✅ Certificate pinning<br>✅ HSM key validation |
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| Access Control Bypass | Override authorization checks | Low | High | ✅ Role-based access control<br>✅ Audit logging of all changes |
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### 3. Repudiation
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#### ZK Receipt Attestation
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Denial of Proof Generation | Miner denies creating proof | Low | Medium | ✅ On-chain proof records<br>✅ Signed proof metadata |
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| Receipt Denial | Party denies transaction occurred | Medium | Medium | ✅ Immutable blockchain ledger<br>✅ Cryptographic receipts |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| -------------------------- | --------------------------------- | ---------- | ------ | ----------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Denial of Proof Generation | Miner denies creating proof | Low | Medium | ✅ On-chain proof records<br>✅ Signed proof metadata |
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| Receipt Denial | Party denies transaction occurred | Medium | Medium | ✅ Immutable blockchain ledger<br>✅ Cryptographic receipts |
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#### Confidential Transactions
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Access Denial | User denies accessing data | Low | Medium | ✅ Comprehensive audit logs<br>✅ Non-repudiation signatures |
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| Key Generation Denial | Deny creating encryption keys | Low | Medium | ✅ HSM audit trails<br>✅ Key rotation logs |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| --------------------- | ----------------------------- | ---------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
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| Access Denial | User denies accessing data | Low | Medium | ✅ Comprehensive audit logs<br>✅ Non-repudiation signatures |
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| Key Generation Denial | Deny creating encryption keys | Low | Medium | ✅ HSM audit trails<br>✅ Key rotation logs |
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### 4. Information Disclosure
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#### ZK Receipt Attestation
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Witness Extraction | Extract private inputs from proof | Low | Critical | ✅ Zero-knowledge property<br>✅ No knowledge of witness |
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| Setup Parameter Leak | Expose toxic waste from trusted setup | Low | Critical | ⚠️ Secure multi-party setup<br>⚠️ Parameter destruction |
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| Side-Channel Attacks | Timing/power analysis | Low | Medium | ✅ Constant-time implementations<br>⚠️ Needs hardware security review |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| -------------------- | ------------------------------------- | ---------- | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Witness Extraction | Extract private inputs from proof | Low | Critical | ✅ Zero-knowledge property<br>✅ No knowledge of witness |
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| Setup Parameter Leak | Expose toxic waste from trusted setup | Low | Critical | ⚠️ Secure multi-party setup<br>⚠️ Parameter destruction |
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| Side-Channel Attacks | Timing/power analysis | Low | Medium | ✅ Constant-time implementations<br>⚠️ Needs hardware security review |
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#### Confidential Transactions
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Private Key Extraction | Steal keys from HSM | Low | Critical | ✅ HSM security controls<br>✅ Hardware tamper resistance |
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| Decryption Key Leak | Expose DEKs | Medium | High | ✅ Per-transaction DEKs<br>✅ Encrypted key storage |
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| Metadata Analysis | Infer data from access patterns | Medium | Medium | ✅ Access logging<br>⚠️ Differential privacy needed |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| ---------------------- | ------------------------------- | ---------- | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Private Key Extraction | Steal keys from HSM | Low | Critical | ✅ HSM security controls<br>✅ Hardware tamper resistance |
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| Decryption Key Leak | Expose DEKs | Medium | High | ✅ Per-transaction DEKs<br>✅ Encrypted key storage |
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| Metadata Analysis | Infer data from access patterns | Medium | Medium | ✅ Access logging<br>⚠️ Differential privacy needed |
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### 5. Denial of Service
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#### ZK Receipt Attestation
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Proof Generation DoS | Overwhelm proof service | High | Medium | ✅ Rate limiting<br>✅ Queue management<br>⚠️ Need monitoring |
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| Verification Spam | Flood verification contract | High | High | ✅ Gas costs limit spam<br>⚠️ Need circuit optimization |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| -------------------- | --------------------------- | ---------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| Proof Generation DoS | Overwhelm proof service | High | Medium | ✅ Rate limiting<br>✅ Queue management<br>⚠️ Need monitoring |
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| Verification Spam | Flood verification contract | High | High | ✅ Gas costs limit spam<br>⚠️ Need circuit optimization |
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#### Confidential Transactions
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Key Exhaustion | Deplete HSM key slots | Medium | Medium | ✅ Key rotation<br>✅ Resource monitoring |
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| Database Overload | Saturate with encrypted data | High | Medium | ✅ Connection pooling<br>✅ Query optimization |
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| Audit Log Flooding | Fill audit storage | Medium | Medium | ✅ Log rotation<br>✅ Storage monitoring |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| ------------------ | ---------------------------- | ---------- | ------ | ---------------------------------------------- |
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| Key Exhaustion | Deplete HSM key slots | Medium | Medium | ✅ Key rotation<br>✅ Resource monitoring |
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| Database Overload | Saturate with encrypted data | High | Medium | ✅ Connection pooling<br>✅ Query optimization |
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| Audit Log Flooding | Fill audit storage | Medium | Medium | ✅ Log rotation<br>✅ Storage monitoring |
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### 6. Elevation of Privilege
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#### ZK Receipt Attestation
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| Setup Privilege | Gain trusted setup access | Low | Critical | ⚠️ Multi-party ceremony<br>⚠️ Independent audits |
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| Coordinator Compromise | Full system control | Medium | Critical | ✅ Multi-sig controls<br>✅ Regular security audits |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| ---------------------- | ------------------------- | ---------- | -------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
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| Setup Privilege | Gain trusted setup access | Low | Critical | ⚠️ Multi-party ceremony<br>⚠️ Independent audits |
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| Coordinator Compromise | Full system control | Medium | Critical | ✅ Multi-sig controls<br>✅ Regular security audits |
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#### Confidential Transactions
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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|--------|-------------|------------|--------|-------------|
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| HSM Takeover | Gain HSM admin access | Low | Critical | ✅ HSM access controls<br>✅ Dual authorization |
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| Access Control Escalation | Bypass role restrictions | Medium | High | ✅ Principle of least privilege<br>✅ Regular access reviews |
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| Threat | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigations |
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| ------------------------- | ------------------------ | ---------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
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| HSM Takeover | Gain HSM admin access | Low | Critical | ✅ HSM access controls<br>✅ Dual authorization |
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| Access Control Escalation | Bypass role restrictions | Medium | High | ✅ Principle of least privilege<br>✅ Regular access reviews |
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## Risk Matrix
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| Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Risk Level | Priority |
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|--------|------------|--------|------------|----------|
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| Trusted Setup Compromise | Low | Critical | HIGH | 1 |
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| HSM Compromise | Low | Critical | HIGH | 1 |
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| Proof Forgery | Medium | High | HIGH | 2 |
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| Private Key Extraction | Low | Critical | HIGH | 2 |
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| Information Disclosure | Medium | High | MEDIUM | 3 |
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| DoS Attacks | High | Medium | MEDIUM | 3 |
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| Side-Channel Attacks | Low | Medium | LOW | 4 |
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| Repudiation | Low | Medium | LOW | 4 |
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| Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Risk Level | Priority |
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| ------------------------ | ---------- | -------- | ---------- | -------- |
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| Trusted Setup Compromise | Low | Critical | HIGH | 1 |
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| HSM Compromise | Low | Critical | HIGH | 1 |
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| Proof Forgery | Medium | High | HIGH | 2 |
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| Private Key Extraction | Low | Critical | HIGH | 2 |
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| Information Disclosure | Medium | High | MEDIUM | 3 |
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| DoS Attacks | High | Medium | MEDIUM | 3 |
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| Side-Channel Attacks | Low | Medium | LOW | 4 |
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| Repudiation | Low | Medium | LOW | 4 |
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## Implemented Mitigations
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### ZK Receipt Attestation
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- ✅ Groth16 soundness and zero-knowledge properties
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- ✅ On-chain verification prevents tampering
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- ✅ Open-source circuit code for transparency
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@@ -156,6 +175,7 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
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- ✅ Comprehensive audit logging
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### Confidential Transactions
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- ✅ AES-256-GCM provides confidentiality and authenticity
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- ✅ HSM-backed key management prevents key extraction
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- ✅ Role-based access control with time restrictions
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@@ -166,6 +186,7 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
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## Recommended Future Improvements
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### Short Term (1-3 months)
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1. **Trusted Setup Ceremony**
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- Implement multi-party computation (MPC) setup
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- Engage independent auditors
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@@ -182,6 +203,7 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
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- Fuzzing of circuit implementations
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### Medium Term (3-6 months)
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1. **Advanced Privacy**
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- Differential privacy for metadata
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- Secure multi-party computation
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@@ -198,6 +220,7 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
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- Regulatory audit tools
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### Long Term (6-12 months)
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1. **Formal Verification**
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- Formal proofs of circuit correctness
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- Verified smart contract deployments
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@@ -211,24 +234,28 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
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## Security Controls Summary
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### Preventive Controls
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- Cryptographic guarantees (ZK proofs, encryption)
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- Access control mechanisms
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- Secure key management
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- Network security (TLS, certificates)
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### Detective Controls
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- Comprehensive audit logging
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- Real-time monitoring
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- Anomaly detection
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- Security incident response
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### Corrective Controls
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- Key rotation procedures
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- Incident response playbooks
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- Backup and recovery
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- System patching processes
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### Compensating Controls
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- Insurance for cryptographic risks
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- Legal protections
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- Community oversight
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@@ -236,23 +263,25 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
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## Compliance Mapping
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| Regulation | Requirement | Implementation |
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|------------|-------------|----------------|
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| GDPR | Right to encryption | ✅ Opt-in confidential transactions |
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| GDPR | Data minimization | ✅ Selective disclosure |
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| SEC 17a-4 | Audit trail | ✅ Immutable logs |
|
||||
| MiFID II | Transaction reporting | ✅ ZK proof verification |
|
||||
| PCI DSS | Key management | ✅ HSM-backed keys |
|
||||
| Regulation | Requirement | Implementation |
|
||||
| ---------- | --------------------- | ----------------------------------- |
|
||||
| GDPR | Right to encryption | ✅ Opt-in confidential transactions |
|
||||
| GDPR | Data minimization | ✅ Selective disclosure |
|
||||
| SEC 17a-4 | Audit trail | ✅ Immutable logs |
|
||||
| MiFID II | Transaction reporting | ✅ ZK proof verification |
|
||||
| PCI DSS | Key management | ✅ HSM-backed keys |
|
||||
|
||||
## Incident Response
|
||||
|
||||
### Security Event Classification
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Critical** - HSM compromise, trusted setup breach
|
||||
2. **High** - Large-scale data breach, proof forgery
|
||||
3. **Medium** - Single key compromise, access violation
|
||||
4. **Low** - Failed authentication, minor DoS
|
||||
|
||||
### Response Procedures
|
||||
|
||||
1. Immediate containment
|
||||
2. Evidence preservation
|
||||
3. Stakeholder notification
|
||||
@@ -276,6 +305,7 @@ This document provides a comprehensive threat model for AITBC's privacy-preservi
|
||||
## Acknowledgments
|
||||
|
||||
This threat model was developed with input from:
|
||||
|
||||
- AITBC Security Team
|
||||
- External Security Consultants
|
||||
- Community Security Researchers
|
||||
@@ -283,4 +313,5 @@ This threat model was developed with input from:
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*This document is living and will be updated as new threats emerge and mitigations are implemented.*
|
||||
_This document is living and will be updated as new threats emerge and
|
||||
mitigations are implemented._
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user