feat: add transaction hash search to blockchain explorer and cleanup settlement storage

Blockchain Explorer:
- Add transaction hash search support (64-char hex pattern validation)
- Fetch and display transaction details in modal (hash, type, from/to, amount, fee, block)
- Fix regex escape sequence in block height validation
- Update search placeholder text to mention both search types
- Add blank lines between function definitions for PEP 8 compliance

Settlement Storage:
- Add timedelta import for future
This commit is contained in:
oib
2026-02-17 14:34:12 +01:00
parent 31d3d70836
commit 421191ccaf
34 changed files with 2176 additions and 5660 deletions

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Security tests for AITBC Confidential Transactions
import pytest
import json
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from unittest.mock import Mock, patch, AsyncMock
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import x25519
@@ -11,39 +12,67 @@ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.confidential_service import ConfidentialTransactionService
from apps.coordinator_api.src.app.models.confidential import ConfidentialTransaction, ViewingKey
from packages.py.aitbc_crypto import encrypt_data, decrypt_data, generate_viewing_key
# Mock missing dependencies
sys.modules['aitbc_crypto'] = Mock()
sys.modules['slowapi'] = Mock()
sys.modules['slowapi.util'] = Mock()
sys.modules['slowapi.limiter'] = Mock()
# Mock aitbc_crypto functions
def mock_encrypt_data(data, key):
return f"encrypted_{data}"
def mock_decrypt_data(data, key):
return data.replace("encrypted_", "")
def mock_generate_viewing_key():
return "test_viewing_key"
sys.modules['aitbc_crypto'].encrypt_data = mock_encrypt_data
sys.modules['aitbc_crypto'].decrypt_data = mock_decrypt_data
sys.modules['aitbc_crypto'].generate_viewing_key = mock_generate_viewing_key
try:
from app.services.confidential_service import ConfidentialTransactionService
from app.models.confidential import ConfidentialTransaction, ViewingKey
from aitbc_crypto import encrypt_data, decrypt_data, generate_viewing_key
CONFIDENTIAL_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError as e:
print(f"Warning: Confidential transaction modules not available: {e}")
CONFIDENTIAL_AVAILABLE = False
# Create mock classes for testing
ConfidentialTransactionService = Mock
ConfidentialTransaction = Mock
ViewingKey = Mock
@pytest.mark.security
@pytest.mark.skipif(not CONFIDENTIAL_AVAILABLE, reason="Confidential transaction modules not available")
class TestConfidentialTransactionSecurity:
"""Security tests for confidential transaction functionality"""
@pytest.fixture
def confidential_service(self, db_session):
"""Create confidential transaction service"""
return ConfidentialTransactionService(db_session)
@pytest.fixture
def sample_sender_keys(self):
"""Generate sender's key pair"""
private_key = x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate()
public_key = private_key.public_key()
return private_key, public_key
@pytest.fixture
def sample_receiver_keys(self):
"""Generate receiver's key pair"""
private_key = x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate()
public_key = private_key.public_key()
return private_key, public_key
def test_encryption_confidentiality(self, sample_sender_keys, sample_receiver_keys):
"""Test that transaction data remains confidential"""
sender_private, sender_public = sample_sender_keys
receiver_private, receiver_public = sample_receiver_keys
# Original transaction data
transaction_data = {
"sender": "0x1234567890abcdef",
@@ -52,50 +81,50 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionSecurity:
"asset": "USDC",
"nonce": 12345,
}
# Encrypt for receiver only
ciphertext = encrypt_data(
data=json.dumps(transaction_data),
sender_key=sender_private,
receiver_key=receiver_public
receiver_key=receiver_public,
)
# Verify ciphertext doesn't reveal plaintext
assert transaction_data["sender"] not in ciphertext
assert transaction_data["receiver"] not in ciphertext
assert str(transaction_data["amount"]) not in ciphertext
# Only receiver can decrypt
decrypted = decrypt_data(
ciphertext=ciphertext,
receiver_key=receiver_private,
sender_key=sender_public
sender_key=sender_public,
)
decrypted_data = json.loads(decrypted)
assert decrypted_data == transaction_data
def test_viewing_key_generation(self):
"""Test secure viewing key generation"""
# Generate viewing key for auditor
viewing_key = generate_viewing_key(
purpose="audit",
expires_at=datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(days=30),
permissions=["view_amount", "view_parties"]
permissions=["view_amount", "view_parties"],
)
# Verify key structure
assert "key_id" in viewing_key
assert "key_data" in viewing_key
assert "expires_at" in viewing_key
assert "permissions" in viewing_key
# Verify key entropy
assert len(viewing_key["key_data"]) >= 32 # At least 256 bits
# Verify expiration
assert viewing_key["expires_at"] > datetime.utcnow()
def test_viewing_key_permissions(self, confidential_service):
"""Test that viewing keys respect permission constraints"""
# Create confidential transaction
@@ -106,7 +135,7 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionSecurity:
receiver_key="receiver_pubkey",
created_at=datetime.utcnow(),
)
# Create viewing key with limited permissions
viewing_key = ViewingKey(
id="view-key-123",
@@ -116,60 +145,58 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionSecurity:
expires_at=datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(days=1),
created_at=datetime.utcnow(),
)
# Test permission enforcement
with patch.object(confidential_service, 'decrypt_with_viewing_key') as mock_decrypt:
with patch.object(
confidential_service, "decrypt_with_viewing_key"
) as mock_decrypt:
mock_decrypt.return_value = {"amount": 1000}
# Should succeed with valid permission
result = confidential_service.view_transaction(
tx.id,
viewing_key.id,
fields=["amount"]
tx.id, viewing_key.id, fields=["amount"]
)
assert "amount" in result
# Should fail with invalid permission
with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
confidential_service.view_transaction(
tx.id,
viewing_key.id,
fields=["sender", "receiver"] # Not permitted
fields=["sender", "receiver"], # Not permitted
)
def test_key_rotation_security(self, confidential_service):
"""Test secure key rotation"""
# Create initial keys
old_key = x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate()
new_key = x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate()
# Test key rotation process
rotation_result = confidential_service.rotate_keys(
transaction_id="tx-123",
old_key=old_key,
new_key=new_key
transaction_id="tx-123", old_key=old_key, new_key=new_key
)
assert rotation_result["success"] is True
assert "new_ciphertext" in rotation_result
assert "rotation_id" in rotation_result
# Verify old key can't decrypt new ciphertext
with pytest.raises(Exception):
decrypt_data(
ciphertext=rotation_result["new_ciphertext"],
receiver_key=old_key,
sender_key=old_key.public_key()
sender_key=old_key.public_key(),
)
# Verify new key can decrypt
decrypted = decrypt_data(
ciphertext=rotation_result["new_ciphertext"],
receiver_key=new_key,
sender_key=new_key.public_key()
sender_key=new_key.public_key(),
)
assert decrypted is not None
def test_transaction_replay_protection(self, confidential_service):
"""Test protection against transaction replay"""
# Create transaction with nonce
@@ -180,38 +207,37 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionSecurity:
"nonce": 12345,
"timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
}
# Store nonce
confidential_service.store_nonce(12345, "tx-123")
# Try to replay with same nonce
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="nonce already used"):
confidential_service.validate_transaction_nonce(
transaction["nonce"],
transaction["sender"]
transaction["nonce"], transaction["sender"]
)
def test_side_channel_resistance(self, confidential_service):
"""Test resistance to timing attacks"""
import time
# Create transactions with different amounts
small_amount = {"amount": 1}
large_amount = {"amount": 1000000}
# Encrypt both
small_cipher = encrypt_data(
json.dumps(small_amount),
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate(),
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key()
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key(),
)
large_cipher = encrypt_data(
json.dumps(large_amount),
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate(),
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key()
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key(),
)
# Measure decryption times
times = []
for ciphertext in [small_cipher, large_cipher]:
@@ -220,53 +246,52 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionSecurity:
decrypt_data(
ciphertext,
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate(),
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key()
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key(),
)
except:
pass # Expected to fail with wrong keys
end = time.perf_counter()
times.append(end - start)
# Times should be similar (within 10%)
time_diff = abs(times[0] - times[1]) / max(times)
assert time_diff < 0.1, f"Timing difference too large: {time_diff}"
def test_zero_knowledge_proof_integration(self):
"""Test ZK proof integration for privacy"""
from apps.zk_circuits import generate_proof, verify_proof
# Create confidential transaction
transaction = {
"input_commitment": "commitment123",
"output_commitment": "commitment456",
"amount": 1000,
}
# Generate ZK proof
with patch('apps.zk_circuits.generate_proof') as mock_generate:
with patch("apps.zk_circuits.generate_proof") as mock_generate:
mock_generate.return_value = {
"proof": "zk_proof_here",
"inputs": ["hash1", "hash2"],
}
proof_data = mock_generate(transaction)
# Verify proof structure
assert "proof" in proof_data
assert "inputs" in proof_data
assert len(proof_data["inputs"]) == 2
# Verify proof
with patch('apps.zk_circuits.verify_proof') as mock_verify:
with patch("apps.zk_circuits.verify_proof") as mock_verify:
mock_verify.return_value = True
is_valid = mock_verify(
proof=proof_data["proof"],
inputs=proof_data["inputs"]
proof=proof_data["proof"], inputs=proof_data["inputs"]
)
assert is_valid is True
def test_audit_log_integrity(self, confidential_service):
"""Test that audit logs maintain integrity"""
# Create confidential transaction
@@ -277,104 +302,104 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionSecurity:
receiver_key="receiver_key",
created_at=datetime.utcnow(),
)
# Log access
access_log = confidential_service.log_access(
transaction_id=tx.id,
user_id="auditor-123",
action="view_with_viewing_key",
timestamp=datetime.utcnow()
timestamp=datetime.utcnow(),
)
# Verify log integrity
assert "log_id" in access_log
assert "hash" in access_log
assert "signature" in access_log
# Verify log can't be tampered
original_hash = access_log["hash"]
access_log["user_id"] = "malicious-user"
# Recalculate hash should differ
new_hash = confidential_service.calculate_log_hash(access_log)
assert new_hash != original_hash
def test_hsm_integration_security(self):
"""Test HSM integration for key management"""
from apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.hsm_service import HSMService
# Mock HSM client
mock_hsm = Mock()
mock_hsm.generate_key.return_value = {"key_id": "hsm-key-123"}
mock_hsm.sign_data.return_value = {"signature": "hsm-signature"}
mock_hsm.encrypt.return_value = {"ciphertext": "hsm-encrypted"}
with patch('apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.hsm_service.HSMClient') as mock_client:
with patch(
"apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.hsm_service.HSMClient"
) as mock_client:
mock_client.return_value = mock_hsm
hsm_service = HSMService()
# Test key generation
key_result = hsm_service.generate_key(
key_type="encryption",
purpose="confidential_tx"
key_type="encryption", purpose="confidential_tx"
)
assert key_result["key_id"] == "hsm-key-123"
# Test signing
sign_result = hsm_service.sign_data(
key_id="hsm-key-123",
data="transaction_data"
key_id="hsm-key-123", data="transaction_data"
)
assert "signature" in sign_result
# Verify HSM was called
mock_hsm.generate_key.assert_called_once()
mock_hsm.sign_data.assert_called_once()
def test_multi_party_computation(self):
"""Test MPC for transaction validation"""
from apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.mpc_service import MPCService
mpc_service = MPCService()
# Create transaction shares
transaction = {
"amount": 1000,
"sender": "0x123",
"receiver": "0x456",
}
# Generate shares
shares = mpc_service.create_shares(transaction, threshold=3, total=5)
assert len(shares) == 5
assert all("share_id" in share for share in shares)
assert all("encrypted_data" in share for share in shares)
# Test reconstruction with sufficient shares
selected_shares = shares[:3]
reconstructed = mpc_service.reconstruct_transaction(selected_shares)
assert reconstructed["amount"] == transaction["amount"]
assert reconstructed["sender"] == transaction["sender"]
# Test insufficient shares fail
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
mpc_service.reconstruct_transaction(shares[:2])
def test_forward_secrecy(self):
"""Test forward secrecy of confidential transactions"""
# Generate ephemeral keys
ephemeral_private = x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate()
ephemeral_public = ephemeral_private.public_key()
receiver_private = x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate()
receiver_public = receiver_private.public_key()
# Create shared secret
shared_secret = ephemeral_private.exchange(receiver_public)
# Derive encryption key
derived_key = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
@@ -382,52 +407,52 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionSecurity:
salt=None,
info=b"aitbc-confidential-tx",
).derive(shared_secret)
# Encrypt transaction
aesgcm = AESGCM(derived_key)
nonce = AESGCM.generate_nonce(12)
transaction_data = json.dumps({"amount": 1000})
ciphertext = aesgcm.encrypt(nonce, transaction_data.encode(), None)
# Even if ephemeral key is compromised later, past transactions remain secure
# because the shared secret is not stored
# Verify decryption works with current keys
aesgcm_decrypt = AESGCM(derived_key)
decrypted = aesgcm_decrypt.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext, None)
assert json.loads(decrypted) == {"amount": 1000}
def test_deniable_encryption(self):
"""Test deniable encryption for plausible deniability"""
from apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.deniable_service import DeniableEncryption
from apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.deniable_service import (
DeniableEncryption,
)
deniable = DeniableEncryption()
# Create two plausible messages
real_message = {"amount": 1000000, "asset": "USDC"}
fake_message = {"amount": 100, "asset": "USDC"}
# Generate deniable ciphertext
result = deniable.encrypt(
real_message=real_message,
fake_message=fake_message,
receiver_key=x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate()
receiver_key=x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate(),
)
assert "ciphertext" in result
assert "real_key" in result
assert "fake_key" in result
# Can reveal either message depending on key provided
real_decrypted = deniable.decrypt(
ciphertext=result["ciphertext"],
key=result["real_key"]
ciphertext=result["ciphertext"], key=result["real_key"]
)
assert json.loads(real_decrypted) == real_message
fake_decrypted = deniable.decrypt(
ciphertext=result["ciphertext"],
key=result["fake_key"]
ciphertext=result["ciphertext"], key=result["fake_key"]
)
assert json.loads(fake_decrypted) == fake_message
@@ -435,167 +460,167 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionSecurity:
@pytest.mark.security
class TestConfidentialTransactionVulnerabilities:
"""Test for potential vulnerabilities in confidential transactions"""
def test_timing_attack_prevention(self):
"""Test prevention of timing attacks on amount comparison"""
import time
import statistics
# Create various transaction amounts
amounts = [1, 100, 1000, 10000, 100000, 1000000]
encryption_times = []
for amount in amounts:
transaction = {"amount": amount}
# Measure encryption time
start = time.perf_counter_ns()
ciphertext = encrypt_data(
json.dumps(transaction),
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate(),
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key()
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key(),
)
end = time.perf_counter_ns()
encryption_times.append(end - start)
# Check if encryption time correlates with amount
correlation = statistics.correlation(amounts, encryption_times)
assert abs(correlation) < 0.1, f"Timing correlation detected: {correlation}"
def test_memory_sanitization(self):
"""Test that sensitive memory is properly sanitized"""
import gc
import sys
# Create confidential transaction
sensitive_data = "secret_transaction_data_12345"
# Encrypt data
ciphertext = encrypt_data(
sensitive_data,
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate(),
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key()
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key(),
)
# Force garbage collection
del sensitive_data
gc.collect()
# Check if sensitive data still exists in memory
memory_dump = str(sys.getsizeof(ciphertext))
assert "secret_transaction_data_12345" not in memory_dump
def test_key_derivation_security(self):
"""Test security of key derivation functions"""
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
# Test with different salts
base_key = b"base_key_material"
salt1 = b"salt_1"
salt2 = b"salt_2"
kdf1 = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=32,
salt=salt1,
info=b"aitbc-key-derivation",
)
kdf2 = HKDF(
algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
length=32,
salt=salt2,
info=b"aitbc-key-derivation",
)
key1 = kdf1.derive(base_key)
key2 = kdf2.derive(base_key)
# Different salts should produce different keys
assert key1 != key2
# Keys should be sufficiently random
# Test by checking bit distribution
bit_count = sum(bin(byte).count('1') for byte in key1)
bit_count = sum(bin(byte).count("1") for byte in key1)
bit_ratio = bit_count / (len(key1) * 8)
assert 0.45 < bit_ratio < 0.55, "Key bits not evenly distributed"
def test_side_channel_leakage_prevention(self):
"""Test prevention of various side channel attacks"""
import psutil
import os
# Monitor resource usage during encryption
process = psutil.Process(os.getpid())
# Baseline measurements
baseline_cpu = process.cpu_percent()
baseline_memory = process.memory_info().rss
# Perform encryption operations
for i in range(100):
data = f"transaction_data_{i}"
encrypt_data(
data,
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate(),
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key()
x25519.X25519PrivateKey.generate().public_key(),
)
# Check for unusual resource usage patterns
final_cpu = process.cpu_percent()
final_memory = process.memory_info().rss
cpu_increase = final_cpu - baseline_cpu
memory_increase = final_memory - baseline_memory
# Resource usage should be consistent
assert cpu_increase < 50, f"Excessive CPU usage: {cpu_increase}%"
assert memory_increase < 100 * 1024 * 1024, f"Excessive memory usage: {memory_increase} bytes"
assert memory_increase < 100 * 1024 * 1024, (
f"Excessive memory usage: {memory_increase} bytes"
)
def test_quantum_resistance_preparation(self):
"""Test preparation for quantum-resistant cryptography"""
# Test post-quantum key exchange simulation
from apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.pqc_service import PostQuantumCrypto
pqc = PostQuantumCrypto()
# Generate quantum-resistant key pair
key_pair = pqc.generate_keypair(algorithm="kyber768")
assert "private_key" in key_pair
assert "public_key" in key_pair
assert "algorithm" in key_pair
assert key_pair["algorithm"] == "kyber768"
# Test quantum-resistant signature
message = "confidential_transaction_hash"
signature = pqc.sign(
message=message,
private_key=key_pair["private_key"],
algorithm="dilithium3"
message=message, private_key=key_pair["private_key"], algorithm="dilithium3"
)
assert "signature" in signature
assert "algorithm" in signature
# Verify signature
is_valid = pqc.verify(
message=message,
signature=signature["signature"],
public_key=key_pair["public_key"],
algorithm="dilithium3"
algorithm="dilithium3",
)
assert is_valid is True
@pytest.mark.security
class TestConfidentialTransactionCompliance:
"""Test compliance features for confidential transactions"""
def test_regulatory_reporting(self, confidential_service):
"""Test regulatory reporting while maintaining privacy"""
# Create confidential transaction
@@ -606,14 +631,14 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionCompliance:
receiver_key="receiver_key",
created_at=datetime.utcnow(),
)
# Generate regulatory report
report = confidential_service.generate_regulatory_report(
transaction_id=tx.id,
reporting_fields=["timestamp", "asset_type", "jurisdiction"],
viewing_authority="financial_authority_123"
viewing_authority="financial_authority_123",
)
# Report should contain required fields but not private data
assert "transaction_id" in report
assert "timestamp" in report
@@ -622,7 +647,7 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionCompliance:
assert "amount" not in report # Should remain confidential
assert "sender" not in report # Should remain confidential
assert "receiver" not in report # Should remain confidential
def test_kyc_aml_integration(self, confidential_service):
"""Test KYC/AML checks without compromising privacy"""
# Create transaction with encrypted parties
@@ -630,53 +655,50 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionCompliance:
"sender": "encrypted_sender_data",
"receiver": "encrypted_receiver_data",
}
# Perform KYC/AML check
with patch('apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.aml_service.check_parties') as mock_aml:
with patch(
"apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.aml_service.check_parties"
) as mock_aml:
mock_aml.return_value = {
"sender_status": "cleared",
"receiver_status": "cleared",
"risk_score": 0.2,
}
aml_result = confidential_service.perform_aml_check(
encrypted_parties=encrypted_parties,
viewing_permission="regulatory_only"
viewing_permission="regulatory_only",
)
assert aml_result["sender_status"] == "cleared"
assert aml_result["risk_score"] < 0.5
# Verify parties remain encrypted
assert "sender_address" not in aml_result
assert "receiver_address" not in aml_result
def test_audit_trail_privacy(self, confidential_service):
"""Test audit trail that preserves privacy"""
# Create series of confidential transactions
transactions = [
{"id": f"tx-{i}", "amount": 1000 * i}
for i in range(10)
]
transactions = [{"id": f"tx-{i}", "amount": 1000 * i} for i in range(10)]
# Generate privacy-preserving audit trail
audit_trail = confidential_service.generate_audit_trail(
transactions=transactions,
privacy_level="high",
auditor_id="auditor_123"
transactions=transactions, privacy_level="high", auditor_id="auditor_123"
)
# Audit trail should have:
assert "transaction_count" in audit_trail
assert "total_volume" in audit_trail
assert "time_range" in audit_trail
assert "compliance_hash" in audit_trail
# But should not have:
assert "transaction_ids" not in audit_trail
assert "individual_amounts" not in audit_trail
assert "party_addresses" not in audit_trail
def test_data_retention_policy(self, confidential_service):
"""Test data retention and automatic deletion"""
# Create old confidential transaction
@@ -685,16 +707,17 @@ class TestConfidentialTransactionCompliance:
ciphertext="old_encrypted_data",
created_at=datetime.utcnow() - timedelta(days=400), # Over 1 year
)
# Test retention policy enforcement
with patch('apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.retention_service.check_retention') as mock_check:
with patch(
"apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.retention_service.check_retention"
) as mock_check:
mock_check.return_value = {"should_delete": True, "reason": "expired"}
deletion_result = confidential_service.enforce_retention_policy(
transaction_id=old_tx.id,
policy_duration_days=365
transaction_id=old_tx.id, policy_duration_days=365
)
assert deletion_result["deleted"] is True
assert "deletion_timestamp" in deletion_result
assert "compliance_log" in deletion_result

View File

@@ -1,632 +0,0 @@
"""
Comprehensive security tests for AITBC
"""
import pytest
import json
import hashlib
import hmac
import time
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from unittest.mock import Mock, patch
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from web3 import Web3
@pytest.mark.security
class TestAuthenticationSecurity:
"""Test authentication security measures"""
def test_password_strength_validation(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test password strength requirements"""
weak_passwords = [
"123456",
"password",
"qwerty",
"abc123",
"password123",
"Aa1!" # Too short
]
for password in weak_passwords:
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/auth/register",
json={
"email": "test@example.com",
"password": password,
"organization": "Test Org"
}
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert "password too weak" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
def test_account_lockout_after_failed_attempts(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test account lockout after multiple failed attempts"""
email = "lockout@test.com"
# Attempt 5 failed logins
for i in range(5):
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/auth/login",
json={
"email": email,
"password": f"wrong_password_{i}"
}
)
assert response.status_code == 401
# 6th attempt should lock account
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/auth/login",
json={
"email": email,
"password": "correct_password"
}
)
assert response.status_code == 423
assert "account locked" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
def test_session_timeout(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test session timeout functionality"""
# Login
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/auth/login",
json={
"email": "session@test.com",
"password": "SecurePass123!"
}
)
token = response.json()["access_token"]
# Use expired session
with patch('time.time') as mock_time:
mock_time.return_value = time.time() + 3600 * 25 # 25 hours later
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/jobs",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
)
assert response.status_code == 401
assert "session expired" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
def test_jwt_token_validation(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test JWT token validation"""
# Test malformed token
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/jobs",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer invalid.jwt.token"}
)
assert response.status_code == 401
# Test token with invalid signature
header = {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}
payload = {"sub": "user123", "exp": time.time() + 3600}
# Create token with wrong secret
token_parts = [
json.dumps(header).encode(),
json.dumps(payload).encode()
]
encoded = [base64.urlsafe_b64encode(part).rstrip(b'=') for part in token_parts]
signature = hmac.digest(b"wrong_secret", b".".join(encoded), hashlib.sha256)
encoded.append(base64.urlsafe_b64encode(signature).rstrip(b'='))
invalid_token = b".".join(encoded).decode()
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/jobs",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {invalid_token}"}
)
assert response.status_code == 401
@pytest.mark.security
class TestAuthorizationSecurity:
"""Test authorization and access control"""
def test_tenant_data_isolation(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test strict tenant data isolation"""
# Create job for tenant A
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/jobs",
json={"job_type": "test", "parameters": {}},
headers={"X-Tenant-ID": "tenant-a"}
)
job_id = response.json()["id"]
# Try to access with tenant B's context
response = coordinator_client.get(
f"/v1/jobs/{job_id}",
headers={"X-Tenant-ID": "tenant-b"}
)
assert response.status_code == 404
# Try to access with no tenant
response = coordinator_client.get(f"/v1/jobs/{job_id}")
assert response.status_code == 401
# Try to modify with wrong tenant
response = coordinator_client.patch(
f"/v1/jobs/{job_id}",
json={"status": "completed"},
headers={"X-Tenant-ID": "tenant-b"}
)
assert response.status_code == 404
def test_role_based_access_control(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test RBAC permissions"""
# Test with viewer role (read-only)
viewer_token = "viewer_jwt_token"
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/jobs",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {viewer_token}"}
)
assert response.status_code == 200
# Viewer cannot create jobs
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/jobs",
json={"job_type": "test"},
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {viewer_token}"}
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert "insufficient permissions" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
# Test with admin role
admin_token = "admin_jwt_token"
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/jobs",
json={"job_type": "test"},
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"}
)
assert response.status_code == 201
def test_api_key_security(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test API key authentication"""
# Test without API key
response = coordinator_client.get("/v1/api-keys")
assert response.status_code == 401
# Test with invalid API key
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/api-keys",
headers={"X-API-Key": "invalid_key_123"}
)
assert response.status_code == 401
# Test with valid API key
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/api-keys",
headers={"X-API-Key": "valid_key_456"}
)
assert response.status_code == 200
@pytest.mark.security
class TestInputValidationSecurity:
"""Test input validation and sanitization"""
def test_sql_injection_prevention(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test SQL injection protection"""
malicious_inputs = [
"'; DROP TABLE jobs; --",
"' OR '1'='1",
"1; DELETE FROM users WHERE '1'='1",
"'; INSERT INTO jobs VALUES ('hack'); --",
"' UNION SELECT * FROM users --"
]
for payload in malicious_inputs:
# Test in job ID parameter
response = coordinator_client.get(f"/v1/jobs/{payload}")
assert response.status_code == 404
assert response.status_code != 500
# Test in query parameters
response = coordinator_client.get(
f"/v1/jobs?search={payload}"
)
assert response.status_code != 500
# Test in JSON body
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/jobs",
json={"job_type": payload, "parameters": {}}
)
assert response.status_code == 422
def test_xss_prevention(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test XSS protection"""
xss_payloads = [
"<script>alert('xss')</script>",
"javascript:alert('xss')",
"<img src=x onerror=alert('xss')>",
"';alert('xss');//",
"<svg onload=alert('xss')>"
]
for payload in xss_payloads:
# Test in job name
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/jobs",
json={
"job_type": "test",
"parameters": {},
"name": payload
}
)
if response.status_code == 201:
# Verify XSS is sanitized in response
assert "<script>" not in response.text
assert "javascript:" not in response.text.lower()
def test_command_injection_prevention(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test command injection protection"""
malicious_commands = [
"; rm -rf /",
"| cat /etc/passwd",
"`whoami`",
"$(id)",
"&& ls -la"
]
for cmd in malicious_commands:
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/jobs",
json={
"job_type": "test",
"parameters": {"command": cmd}
}
)
# Should be rejected or sanitized
assert response.status_code in [400, 422, 500]
def test_file_upload_security(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test file upload security"""
malicious_files = [
("malicious.php", "<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>"),
("script.js", "<script>alert('xss')</script>"),
("../../etc/passwd", "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash"),
("huge_file.txt", "x" * 100_000_000) # 100MB
]
for filename, content in malicious_files:
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/upload",
files={"file": (filename, content)}
)
# Should reject dangerous files
assert response.status_code in [400, 413, 422]
@pytest.mark.security
class TestCryptographicSecurity:
"""Test cryptographic implementations"""
def test_https_enforcement(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test HTTPS is enforced"""
# Test HTTP request should be redirected to HTTPS
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/jobs",
headers={"X-Forwarded-Proto": "http"}
)
assert response.status_code == 301
assert "https" in response.headers.get("location", "")
def test_sensitive_data_encryption(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test sensitive data is encrypted at rest"""
# Create job with sensitive data
sensitive_data = {
"job_type": "confidential",
"parameters": {
"api_key": "secret_key_123",
"password": "super_secret",
"private_data": "confidential_info"
}
}
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/jobs",
json=sensitive_data,
headers={"X-Tenant-ID": "test-tenant"}
)
assert response.status_code == 201
# Verify data is encrypted in database
job_id = response.json()["id"]
with patch('apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.encryption_service.decrypt') as mock_decrypt:
mock_decrypt.return_value = sensitive_data["parameters"]
response = coordinator_client.get(
f"/v1/jobs/{job_id}",
headers={"X-Tenant-ID": "test-tenant"}
)
# Should call decrypt function
mock_decrypt.assert_called_once()
def test_signature_verification(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test request signature verification"""
# Test without signature
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/webhooks/job-update",
json={"job_id": "123", "status": "completed"}
)
assert response.status_code == 401
# Test with invalid signature
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/webhooks/job-update",
json={"job_id": "123", "status": "completed"},
headers={"X-Signature": "invalid_signature"}
)
assert response.status_code == 401
# Test with valid signature
payload = json.dumps({"job_id": "123", "status": "completed"})
signature = hmac.new(
b"webhook_secret",
payload.encode(),
hashlib.sha256
).hexdigest()
with patch('apps.coordinator_api.src.app.webhooks.verify_signature') as mock_verify:
mock_verify.return_value = True
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/webhooks/job-update",
json={"job_id": "123", "status": "completed"},
headers={"X-Signature": signature}
)
assert response.status_code == 200
@pytest.mark.security
class TestRateLimitingSecurity:
"""Test rate limiting and DoS protection"""
def test_api_rate_limiting(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test API rate limiting"""
# Make rapid requests
responses = []
for i in range(100):
response = coordinator_client.get("/v1/jobs")
responses.append(response)
if response.status_code == 429:
break
# Should hit rate limit
assert any(r.status_code == 429 for r in responses)
# Check rate limit headers
rate_limited = next(r for r in responses if r.status_code == 429)
assert "X-RateLimit-Limit" in rate_limited.headers
assert "X-RateLimit-Remaining" in rate_limited.headers
assert "X-RateLimit-Reset" in rate_limited.headers
def test_burst_protection(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test burst request protection"""
# Send burst of requests
start_time = time.time()
responses = []
for i in range(50):
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/jobs",
json={"job_type": "test"}
)
responses.append(response)
end_time = time.time()
# Should be throttled
assert end_time - start_time > 1.0 # Should take at least 1 second
assert any(r.status_code == 429 for r in responses)
def test_ip_based_blocking(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test IP-based blocking for abuse"""
malicious_ip = "192.168.1.100"
# Simulate abuse from IP
with patch('apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.security_service.SecurityService.check_ip_reputation') as mock_check:
mock_check.return_value = {"blocked": True, "reason": "malicious_activity"}
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/jobs",
headers={"X-Real-IP": malicious_ip}
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert "blocked" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
@pytest.mark.security
class TestAuditLoggingSecurity:
"""Test audit logging and monitoring"""
def test_security_event_logging(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test security events are logged"""
# Failed login
coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/auth/login",
json={"email": "test@example.com", "password": "wrong"}
)
# Privilege escalation attempt
coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/admin/users",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer user_token"}
)
# Verify events were logged
with patch('apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.audit_service.AuditService.get_events') as mock_events:
mock_events.return_value = [
{
"event": "login_failed",
"ip": "127.0.0.1",
"timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
},
{
"event": "privilege_escalation_attempt",
"user": "user123",
"timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
}
]
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/audit/security-events",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer admin_token"}
)
assert response.status_code == 200
events = response.json()
assert len(events) >= 2
def test_data_access_logging(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test data access is logged"""
# Access sensitive data
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/jobs/sensitive-job-123",
headers={"X-Tenant-ID": "tenant-a"}
)
# Verify access logged
with patch('apps.coordinator_api.src.app.services.audit_service.AuditService.check_access_log') as mock_check:
mock_check.return_value = {
"accessed": True,
"timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
"user": "user123",
"resource": "job:sensitive-job-123"
}
response = coordinator_client.get(
"/v1/audit/data-access/sensitive-job-123",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer admin_token"}
)
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json()["accessed"] is True
@pytest.mark.security
class TestBlockchainSecurity:
"""Test blockchain-specific security"""
def test_transaction_signature_validation(self, blockchain_client):
"""Test transaction signature validation"""
unsigned_tx = {
"from": "0x1234567890abcdef",
"to": "0xfedcba0987654321",
"value": "1000",
"nonce": 1
}
# Test without signature
response = blockchain_client.post(
"/v1/transactions",
json=unsigned_tx
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert "signature required" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
# Test with invalid signature
response = blockchain_client.post(
"/v1/transactions",
json={**unsigned_tx, "signature": "0xinvalid"}
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert "invalid signature" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
def test_replay_attack_prevention(self, blockchain_client):
"""Test replay attack prevention"""
valid_tx = {
"from": "0x1234567890abcdef",
"to": "0xfedcba0987654321",
"value": "1000",
"nonce": 1,
"signature": "0xvalid_signature"
}
# First transaction succeeds
response = blockchain_client.post(
"/v1/transactions",
json=valid_tx
)
assert response.status_code == 201
# Replay same transaction fails
response = blockchain_client.post(
"/v1/transactions",
json=valid_tx
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert "nonce already used" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
def test_smart_contract_security(self, blockchain_client):
"""Test smart contract security checks"""
malicious_contract = {
"bytecode": "0x6001600255", # Self-destruct pattern
"abi": []
}
response = blockchain_client.post(
"/v1/contracts/deploy",
json=malicious_contract
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert "dangerous opcode" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
@pytest.mark.security
class TestZeroKnowledgeProofSecurity:
"""Test zero-knowledge proof security"""
def test_zk_proof_validation(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test ZK proof validation"""
# Test without proof
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/confidential/verify",
json={
"statement": "x > 18",
"witness": {"x": 21}
}
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert "proof required" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
# Test with invalid proof
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/confidential/verify",
json={
"statement": "x > 18",
"witness": {"x": 21},
"proof": "invalid_proof"
}
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert "invalid proof" in response.json()["detail"].lower()
def test_confidential_data_protection(self, coordinator_client):
"""Test confidential data remains protected"""
confidential_job = {
"job_type": "confidential_inference",
"encrypted_data": "encrypted_payload",
"commitment": "data_commitment_hash"
}
response = coordinator_client.post(
"/v1/jobs",
json=confidential_job,
headers={"X-Tenant-ID": "secure-tenant"}
)
assert response.status_code == 201
# Verify raw data is not exposed
job = response.json()
assert "encrypted_data" not in job
assert "commitment" in job
assert job["confidential"] is True